Robert:
12-16-01
Thanks for your response. I think I've got a better
picture of what was going on based on your comments. It all seems
to fit in now.
A-326 Tra Cu was a Special Forces outpost built
on an old French outpost and landing strip. It was under B-32 out of Tay
Ninh, and A Company, 5th Special Forces Group headquartered in Bien Hoa.
We allowed the Navy to base their PBR's there after Tet of '68, and they
also used it as a POL dump for their Tango boats that traversed the Van
Co Dom river.
In '69...a group from the Navy's Natick Labs in
New England requested permission to test some sensory devices in the AO,
and despite our objections...the AO was seeded with metallic, heat and
sound sensing devices. You may remember the blimp-like balloon they flew
over the camp, making a perfect aiming stake for NVA and VC gunners. They
later killed 22 of my troops inserting in the Kin Bo Bo canal early one
morning after our motorized assault boats activated a sensor they had put
in the canal to detect san pans. We denied them permission to fire...and
they detonated the 250 lb bomb in the canal anyway.
The camp was home for 4 companies of CIDG mercenaries,
along with a platoon of Kit Carson or Chu Hoi ex-VC. We also had two 155
howitzers from II Field Force positioned their to support our combat operations
that we had in the field 24/7. In addition to the 12 man Special Forces
A-Team...I also commanded a Company of Cambodian Mercenaries attached to
me from the 3rd Mobile Strike Force. They were the ones who drove and fought
in the Airboats...not the Navy.
The Navy was a continual source of frustration to
us...their tactics drew Charlie close to the camp as they loved to hit
them with B-40 rockets as soon as they made the first turn north out of
the camp from the North side of the river less than a click from the camp.
Our problem was that the AO just to the North of the Camp was controlled
by the 25th out of Cu Chi, and it was difficult for us to mount reaction
forces to chase those bastards down without clearance in advance. Every
time the navy got hit...I'd have to send out a platoon to chase those bastards
down. By the time we mustered and inserted on the other side...they were
long gone and back into their tunnel complexes in Boa Tri just south of
Cu Chi.
You may have heard of the tunnels of Cu Chi...we
knew they were there...but no one would listen to us. I even have pictures
of an airstrike I personally called in after we watched a company sized
unit disappear underground on a dike about 5 clicks north of our camp.
I was the Commanding Officer of the entire camp.
The Navy reported to me, along with the CO of the II Field Force Arty.
My AO went from the river west to the Cambodian Border. Since it was a
free-fire zone...all operations and activities had to be cleared through
my Tactical Operation Center, since we had troops in the field 24/7. Our
troops looked like VC from the air...and I can't tell you how many times
we were fired on by a lonesome FAC directing arty out of Cu Chi. Thank
god for 'Cu Chi Arty' who halt all fire missions when I got them on the
horn.
The rub comes from the fact that we were not informed
of your presence in our camp, or the operations you were conducting. Some
of your guys were hit with our H & I fire at night, along with the
Navy calling us with activations of their sensing devices. We would chart
our troops in the AO...and if they weren't ours...we gave permission to
fire. I had the CG from the 25th land in my camp following one of these
incidents in late '69 all ready to court martial me for injuring his troops.
Problem was...they were 5 clicks on the south side of the river...and were
fired on by my sister camp to the North A-325 in Duc Hue.
The other thing that really got to him was that
I wasn't in his chain of command. You guys were all over the place. SF
and the regular Army in VN had a strained relationship to say the least.
The 25th's S-3 was really bad about disregarding Army protocol...and when
I went to Cu Chi to have a face to face with him...he told me that the
25th had already pacified everything in their AO...and it was time for
them to expand their operations. Guess he should have looked in the cellar.
I'm not trying to give you a hard time...that terrain
was some of the worst in VN...and the most heavily boobytrapped. I admire
your courage and only wish your higher ups would have coordinated your
efforts with us. We could have put you in areas where you could have accomplished
your missions a lot more effectively. We knew where they were...and where
they weren't.
Our problem was getting our Vietnamese counter parts
to actively engage them. The VN SF were nothing but corrupt bastards, stuffing
their pockets with CIA money we used to pay our troops. We accomplished
our mission by using the Cambodes who hated the VN and were fierce fighters
committed to their SF advisors.
Anyway...thanks for your response...I'm glad you
made it out of that hell hole in one piece both mentally and physically.
De Oppresso Liber,
Mike O'Shea